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HOW FAR CAN COURT PROCEDURE BE SOCIALIZED WITHOUT IMPAIRING
INDI1
RIGHTS
VIDUAL
EDWAR

F. WAITE2

What do we mean by "socializing" court procedure?
Measuring time by standards appropriate to the development of
human institutions, it may be said that until very recently the courts
were concerned almost wholly with the adjustment of conflicting
claims of individuals and groups against each other, and procedure was
meticulously guarded to prevent unjust advantage, for precisely the
same reasons that dictated the details of the code duello. The modem
tendency toward what is termed the socialization of the courts has produced new tribunals and evolved new functions of older ones in which
the aim is not so much the adjudication of private rights as the performance of what are conceived to be community obligations. This
tendency chiefly interests the lawyer as it has enlarged the use of the
police power to secure the general welfare. It interests the social
worker chiefly as it brings directly and conveniently to his aid the judicial machinery through which alone, according to the traditions of
free peoples, the state may exercise its ultimate authority in time of
peace.
The working out of this tendency toward broader functions and
a more human emphasis and aim has involved a more liberal procedure
or method of transacting the business of the courts, or at least, of certain courts in which the socializing process has made substantial headway. When a court is acting not as an arbiter of private strife but as
the medium of the state's performance of its soverign duties as parens
patriae and promoter of the general welfare, it is natural that some of
the safeguards of judicial contests should be laid aside. This corollary
to the main tendency to which we have referred may be fitly styled the
socialization of court procedure.
I assume that by "individual rights" in our subject is meant those
personal rights recognized by the common.law as adopted in the United
States and established by constitutions, national and state.
'Presented at the Conference on Juvenile Courts held under the joint auspices of the Federal Children's Bureau and the National Probation Association,
Milwaukee, June 21-22, 1921.
2
Judge of the District Court, Minneapolis, Minn.

340

EDWARD F. WAITE

On the basis of these definitions let us consider the following subdivisions of the general subject proposed by those who have prepared
the program:
1. Exclusion of public.
2. Representation by attorneys.
3. Swearing of witnesses.
4. Methods of taking testimony and conformity with rules of evidence.
5. Weight of evidence.
6. Jury trials.
7. Investigation into circumstances of offense.
8. Testimony of probation officers.
9. Use of referee in girls' cases.
The discussion Will relate solely to so-called juvenile courts, and
my contribution is untechnical, summary and suggestive. So far as I
state legal principles I shall undertake to be correct according to interpretations that prevail in my own state, Minnesota. Even were my
learning sufficient I could not differentiate here between the several
states on points where they do not agree.
I have said "so-called juvenile courts" advisedly. I do not reflect
upon those communities where the legislature has not made the radical
change from 'the criminal to the non-criminal type of court in dealing
with delinquent children. But has not the time come to reform our
terminology in the interests of clear thinking? The court which must
direct its procedure even apparently to do something to a child because of what he has done, is parted from the court which is
avowedly concerned only with doing something for a child because of
what he is and needs, by a gulf too wide to be bridged by any humanity
which the judge may introduce into his hearings, or by the habitual
use of corrective rather than punitive methods after conviction. I
suspect that the theory of the juvenile court which stresses the moving ,forward of the common law age of criminal responsibility involves
some bad psychology and is responsible for some bad law. Has not
the time arrived when no tribunal should claim the title of juvenile
court, implying in its origin and major application a jurisdiction and
procedure founded wholly on the parental idea, without distinction in
aim and essential method between delinquent, dependent and neglected
wards of the state, unless this is in its real character? Let other courts
be styled what they are-police or criminal courts for children.
But I should not be warranted in excluding courts of the latter
sort from this discussion. Therefore, having thus filed my protest, I
shall adopt the current nomenclature and refer to all children's courts
as juvenile courts.
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Another comment, to clear the ground: One too often sees departure from these traditional safeguards of the individual which are
familiar in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence explained and justified by the
parental attitude of the juveinle court. Some looseness prevails in
this regard, even in the.opinions of appellate courts. It should not be
forgotten that the performance of judicial functions always involves
two processes: the first, to determine whether jurisdiction assumed for
the' purpose of an inquiry should be retained for the application of a
remedy; the second, application of the remedy. The first seeks the
facts; the second applies the law to the facts as ascertained. Is it not
obvious that the rights of the individual who holds the state at arm's
length and says: "The matters charged are false; government has no
call to interfere with me" should be more strictly regarded during the
first process than the second. when his status as a person with whom
public interference is warranted has been established? Otherwise all
that is necessary to justify a despotism is to make sure it intends to
be benevolent.
Taking up now the suggested sub-topics:
1. Exclusion of Public. One who is accused of crime has a constitutional right to a public trial. As to what a public trial is, the courts
have differed. If a juvenile court is organized as a criminal court
for children any child who comes before it charged with an offense is
entitled to a public trial. If the court that deals with him is exercising chancery jurisdiction, no such constitutional right exists; and for
the purposes of this discussion non-criminal courts with purely statutory jurisdiction over children will be classed, though not with technical
exactness, as courts of chancery jurisdiction. To a mind, "not
warped," as somebody has said, "by study and practice of the law" it
may seem absurd that the hearing in the case of Johnny Jones must
be public if he is charged in a criminal court with stealing, and need
not be so if he is charged in a non-criminal court with being delinquent
because he stole. I shall not now defend this seeming inconsistency.
If it is constitutional law it is binding on the courts and legislatures,
and can be changed only by constitutional amendments.
There is no constitutional right to a public hearing when dependency or neglect is the issue; and the court has no right to deny it in
cases of "contributing," since here it acts always as a criminal court,
whether or not it has also chancery jurisdiction.
Even when the right to a public trial exists much discretion is allowed the judge in the matter of excluding id!e onlookers in the interest
of public decency or the good order of the court proceedings. Prob-
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ably no reasonable exercise of this discretion would ever be questioned
by or on behalf. of a juvenile delinquent, for the protection of whose
sensibilities and reputation it is commonly exercised. Indeed, all
doubtful questions that have arisen in my own experience have had
reference to inclusion rather than exclusion. I have sometimes found
it puzzling to know how far it was just to children and their parents
to permit their troubles to be heard even by qualified social observers
who wished to use the clinical opportunities afforded by court sessi6ns.
The smaller the court room, by the way, the simpler the problem both
ways.
2. Representation by Attorneys. Here also the nature of the
proceding is the proper basis for distinctions. In prosecutions fot
crime, even children, representation by council is a constitutional right.
In non-criminal procedings, however, courts of conciliation and small
claims have made us familiar with the idea that legal rights are not
necessarily violated by the elimination of attorneys. But is it not a
moot question?. Is not the experience of other judges like my own,
that in most cases it is easily possible to make the lawyer who comes
into the juvenile court an ally of the court, and interest him in securing the real welfare of those for whom he appears? The absence of
antagnostic claims of personal rights makes this the more feasible. I
refer, of zourse, to cases immediately involving children. In "contributing" cases appearance of counsel must be permitted, and in my
judgment should be encouraged.
3. Swearing of Witnesses. I fancy most judges exercise wide
discretion in this regard and are not conscious of any danger to personal rights. I can hardly conceive that if desired by the parties concerned all witnesses would not be sworn. Sometimes essential facts
are within the knowledge of a child so young that to put him on oath
would seem unreasonable. An obvious corollary to this situation would
be the conclusion that his testimony would be unreliable. This would
be true in general; and yet skilful questioning by an impartial judge
might elicit important and well accredited truth. The discretion to
determine the competency of a child to testify has always lain with the
court. Would it be any violation of rights for the judge to determine
also whether or not to administer the oath? I think not. The greater
discretion includes the less.
4. (a) Methods of Taking Testimony and (b) Conformity With
Rules of Evidence.
(a)
There can be no question of impairing rights in determining
whether to receive testimony from the witness stand or the floor in
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front of the judge's table; or whether and to what extent the judge
himself shall interrogate witnesses. These and others of like sort are
questions of taste and convenience, and the preference of any person
fit to act as judge ought to be a safe reliance. As between criminal
and non-criminal proceedings interrogation by the court is much more
limited in the former, according to usage in the United States.
(b) More serious questions arise in respect to conformity with
the rules of evidence. Speaking generally, rules of evidence throughout the United States are the rules of the English common law, variously modified by local statutes, and uniform in their application to
all courts deriving authority from the same source-the state or the
nation. I do not happen to know of any legislative rule of evidence
peculiar to juvenile courts except a Minnesota.statute permitting findings upon the written reports of official investigators with like effect
as upon testimony received in open court, in "county allowance" or
"mothers' pension" cases. Rules of ancient origin, approved or at
least tolerated by the community for generations, encountered by the
citizen whenever he resorts to other legal forums to assert or defend
his rights, should not lightly be set aside in juvenile courts. The only
safe practice is to observe them. If hearsay, for example, has not been
found justly admissible in civil disputes and criminal trials, it is no
better in juvenile court proceedings. Exceptions should be made when
appropriate, and informal short cuts will often be found agreeable to
all concerned; but the exception should always be recognized as an
exception. No judge on any bench has need to be more thoroughly
grounded in the principles of evidence and more constantly mindful
of them than the judge of a juvenile court. The boy against whom
it is proposed to make an official record of misconduct, involving possible curtailment of his freedom at the behest of strangers, has a right
to be found delinquent only according to law. The father, however
unworthy, who faces a judicial proceeding, the event of which may be
to say to him-"This child of your loins is henceforth not your child:
the state takes him from you as finally as though by fhe hand of
death"--that father may rightfully demand that the tie of blood shall
be cut only by the sword of constitutional justice. Surely, those substantial rules of evidence which would protect the boy if the state
called its interference "punishment" instead of "protection," and would
safeguard the father in the possession of his dog, should apply to
issues which may involve the right of the boy to liberty within the
family relationship, and the right of the father to his child. The
greater the conceded discretion of the judge, the freer he is from the
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vigilance of lawyers, the less likely he is to have his mistakes corrected
on appeal, so much the more careful should he be to base every judicial conclusion on evidence proper to be received in any court of
justice. Otherwise the state's parental power which he embodies is
prostituted; the interpreter of the law degenerates into the oriental
kadi, and the juvenile court falls into suspicion and disrepute.
5. Weight of Evidence. Shall the standard be preponderance of
evidence or proof beyond a reasonable doubt? The latter, surely,
whenever the proceeding is a criminal one; the former-technically, at
least-in dependency and neglect cases. I say "technically," for while
a jury would be so instructed, it is certain that the average juror, regardless of instructions, will require something more than a mere tipping of the balance before he will agree to a verdict that may separate
protesting parents ifrom their child. And when, as in most cases, the
duty to pass upon disputed facts fall to the fallible intelligence of a
single person, any judge who realizes his responsibility will insist upon
clear proof.
When delinquency cases are heard in non-criminal courts I suppose the true rule to be preponderance of evidence. But here I, at
least, must plead guilty to judicial legislation, and I suspect I am not
alone in this. When we have minimized the stigma of an adjudication
of delinquency in every way that kindly ingenuity may devise, it remains true that in the mind of the child, his family and his acquaintances who know about it, it is practically equivalent to conviction of a
criminal offense. In the .face of this fact legal theory should give way,
and no less evidence should be required than if the hearing were a
criminal trial. In the rare instances when I have juries in the juvenile
court I instruct them to this effect, and I apply the same test to my
own mind in reaching judicial conclusions.
6. Jury Trials. It appears to be well settled that in none of the
cases heard in non-criminal juvenile courts is there a constitutional
right to trial by jury. In Minnesota when juvenile court functions are
exercised by the district court, which is the court of general jurisdiction,
a jury trial may be demanded. This, however, is a privilege granted,
rather than a right confirmed; by the legislature; and the privilege is
rarely claimed. Doubtless this situation is typical. When, however,
the court is so organized that a child is prosecuted for a criminal violation of a state law, I think it is generally understood that a jury must
be called unless specifically waived. The same is true in "contributing"
cases, especially when, as in Minnesota, the act or omission is made a
misdemeanor.
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7. Investigation Into Circumstances of Offense. If there is a
question here it must be as to the use to be made of information obtained rather than as to the propriety of a preliminary investigation
through agents of the court. The value of such an investigation in
suggesting inquiry at the hearing is obvious. But when there are issues
of fact to be tried it seems to me equally plain that statements made to
an investigator out of court should have no standing as evidence when
they are disputed by parties in interest, who by the implications of their
denial demand the same right to be confronted with the witnesses
against them that is freely recognized in other judicial proceedings.
Without attempting a discussion of "due process of law," considerations of public policy seem conclusive. The undisciplined minds of the
juveniles and most of the parents who come before the court cannot
make clear distinctions between proceedings that are really friendly
and paternal and those that are hostile, when the result* may be alike
in depriving them of liberty of action which they had before they
came into court and are unwilling to surrender. Public opinion, too,
looks askance upon any abandonment of traditional barriers against
governmental interference with the citizen. However wise the judge
and kind his purpose, he must have regard to both the individual and
the community sense of justice; and Americans have an ingrained conviction that nothing, however well meant, ought to be forced upon them
on the basis of information obtained behind their backs.
Let it be observed that I am now discussing policy rather than
constitutional rights. As respects non-criminal proceedings, I am not
prepared to set limits to the power of the legislature to enlarge and
adapt to modern conditions the ancient methods of official inquisition.
Professor Wigmore speaks of an increasing need "for the more liberal
recognition of an authority such as would make admissible various
sorts of reports dealing with matters seldom disputable and only provable otherwise at disproportionate inconvenience and cost."
"This
policy," he says, "when judiciously employed, greatly facilitates the
production of evidence without introducing loose methods."
(Evi-

dence, Vol. III, Sec. 1672.)
It is probable that as socialization of the courts proceeds the tendency toward the use of this form of evidence will grow stronger; but
popular prejudices must be reckoned with, and procedural convenience
will be dearly bought if the cost be impairment of the general confidence in the administration of justice.
When, however, the adjudication is made the situation changes.
It has been lawfully determined that the facts warrant the interference
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of the court. The nature and extent of that interference is discretionary
with the judge within the limits set by the law. In exercising his discretion he may rely upon anything that brings conviction to his mind,
and the parties concerned have no legal right to question the sources of
his information. Here official investigation is a proper and valuable
aid, whether made before or after the adjudication.
8. Testimony of Probation Officers. No legal right seems to be
involved: the question is rather one of expediency. In my judgment
the probation officer should not appear as a hostile factor in court proceedings. The friendly relations with child and family that are essential to his corrective and constructive work would thus be jeopardized
in advance. Should adverse information after probation is ordered be
disclosed to the court? By all means if it is important. No confidences
should be received on condition of concealment. The probation officer
is the eyes and ears of the court. What he sees and hears is a part of
the court's knowledge of the case, and ought to be so regarded by all
concerned.
9. Use of Referee in Girls' Cases. Once more a distinction must
be made between criminal and non-criminal proceedings. Probably no
one would suggest the reference of a criminal case against an adult.
Then why of a criminal case against a juvenile? But in non-criminal
matters masters in chancery and statutory referees have familiarized
us with the idea of delegation by the court df some part of its judicial
authority. I think there is no constitutional reason why a court exercising chancery powers as a juvenile court may not be authorized to
appoint a referee not only to examine and recommend but to hear and
determine. Masters of discipline in Colorado, juvenile commissioners
in North Dakota and referees in Missouri are instances where statutes
have expressly authorized such procedure. Other examples are referees
in girls' "cases. I have never heard a suggestion that rights were thus
violated. On the contrary, girls and their parents are likely to deem it
an advantage to have both inquiry and action in a woman's hands.
Doubtless it is the experience of every man who acts as judge in cases
of sex delinquency on the part of girls that, even if he has not the
assistance of an official referee, a woman probation officer relieves him
of embarrassing investigation and virtually determines the appropriate
action.
We may state three general conclusions:
1. In criminal proceedings the child has, before conviction, all the
legal rights of the adult. Here the field of socialization is practically
limited to treatment of the child after conviction.
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In non-criminal proceedings there may be, either with or with-

out express legislative authorization, according to the nature of the
court, the broad latitude customarily exercised by courts of chancery
jurisdiction, this being appropriate and necessary to the full use of
parental functions. Here no constitutional provisions relating to criminal prosecutions apply, and socialization of procedure may have wide
scope. There are limits, however, of which the judge should never be
unmindful.
3. In adopting this broader practice courts should have regard to
the popular sense of justice, even when it is not supported by established principles.of constitutional law.
Do not these conclusions point toward wider powers, freer action,
better and more thoroughly socialized judges for the true juvenile
court, and speedy evolution of the criminal court for children into the
broader type? This process spells, I think, the liberal development of
the family court idea.
Furthermore, while they seem to me in no wise at variance with
the growing tendency toward transfer to the public schools of administrative details after adjudication, do they not negative conclusively the
assumption by any other agency than a court of justice of the task of
adjudicating disputed facts?

